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diff --git a/tdeioslave/http/kcookiejar/rfc2109 b/tdeioslave/http/kcookiejar/rfc2109 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..432fdcc6e --- /dev/null +++ b/tdeioslave/http/kcookiejar/rfc2109 @@ -0,0 +1,1179 @@ + + + + + + +Network Working Group D. Kristol +Request for Comments: 2109 Bell Laboratories, Lucent Technologies +Category: Standards Track L. Montulli + Netscape Communications + February 1997 + + + HTTP State Management Mechanism + +Status of this Memo + + This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the + Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for + improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet + Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state + and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. + +1. ABSTRACT + + This document specifies a way to create a stateful session with HTTP + requests and responses. It describes two new headers, Cookie and + Set-Cookie, which carry state information between participating + origin servers and user agents. The method described here differs + from Netscape's Cookie proposal, but it can interoperate with + HTTP/1.0 user agents that use Netscape's method. (See the HISTORICAL + section.) + +2. TERMINOLOGY + + The terms user agent, client, server, proxy, and origin server have + the same meaning as in the HTTP/1.0 specification. + + Fully-qualified host name (FQHN) means either the fully-qualified + domain name (FQDN) of a host (i.e., a completely specified domain + name ending in a top-level domain such as .com or .uk), or the + numeric Internet Protocol (IP) address of a host. The fully + qualified domain name is preferred; use of numeric IP addresses is + strongly discouraged. + + The terms request-host and request-URI refer to the values the client + would send to the server as, respectively, the host (but not port) + and abs_path portions of the absoluteURI (http_URL) of the HTTP + request line. Note that request-host must be a FQHN. + + + + + + + + +Kristol & Montulli Standards Track [Page 1] + +RFC 2109 HTTP State Management Mechanism February 1997 + + + Hosts names can be specified either as an IP address or a FQHN + string. Sometimes we compare one host name with another. Host A's + name domain-matches host B's if + + * both host names are IP addresses and their host name strings match + exactly; or + + * both host names are FQDN strings and their host name strings match + exactly; or + + * A is a FQDN string and has the form NB, where N is a non-empty name + string, B has the form .B', and B' is a FQDN string. (So, x.y.com + domain-matches .y.com but not y.com.) + + Note that domain-match is not a commutative operation: a.b.c.com + domain-matches .c.com, but not the reverse. + + Because it was used in Netscape's original implementation of state + management, we will use the term cookie to refer to the state + information that passes between an origin server and user agent, and + that gets stored by the user agent. + +3. STATE AND SESSIONS + + This document describes a way to create stateful sessions with HTTP + requests and responses. Currently, HTTP servers respond to each + client request without relating that request to previous or + subsequent requests; the technique allows clients and servers that + wish to exchange state information to place HTTP requests and + responses within a larger context, which we term a "session". This + context might be used to create, for example, a "shopping cart", in + which user selections can be aggregated before purchase, or a + magazine browsing system, in which a user's previous reading affects + which offerings are presented. + + There are, of course, many different potential contexts and thus many + different potential types of session. The designers' paradigm for + sessions created by the exchange of cookies has these key attributes: + + 1. Each session has a beginning and an end. + + 2. Each session is relatively short-lived. + + 3. Either the user agent or the origin server may terminate a + session. + + 4. The session is implicit in the exchange of state information. + + + + +Kristol & Montulli Standards Track [Page 2] + +RFC 2109 HTTP State Management Mechanism February 1997 + + +4. OUTLINE + + We outline here a way for an origin server to send state information + to the user agent, and for the user agent to return the state + information to the origin server. The goal is to have a minimal + impact on HTTP and user agents. Only origin servers that need to + maintain sessions would suffer any significant impact, and that + impact can largely be confined to Common Gateway Interface (CGI) + programs, unless the server provides more sophisticated state + management support. (See Implementation Considerations, below.) + +4.1 Syntax: General + + The two state management headers, Set-Cookie and Cookie, have common + syntactic properties involving attribute-value pairs. The following + grammar uses the notation, and tokens DIGIT (decimal digits) and + token (informally, a sequence of non-special, non-white space + characters) from the HTTP/1.1 specification [RFC 2068] to describe + their syntax. + + av-pairs = av-pair *(";" av-pair) + av-pair = attr ["=" value] ; optional value + attr = token + value = word + word = token | quoted-string + + Attributes (names) (attr) are case-insensitive. White space is + permitted between tokens. Note that while the above syntax + description shows value as optional, most attrs require them. + + NOTE: The syntax above allows whitespace between the attribute and + the = sign. + +4.2 Origin Server Role + +4.2.1 General + + The origin server initiates a session, if it so desires. (Note that + "session" here does not refer to a persistent network connection but + to a logical session created from HTTP requests and responses. The + presence or absence of a persistent connection should have no effect + on the use of cookie-derived sessions). To initiate a session, the + origin server returns an extra response header to the client, Set- + Cookie. (The details follow later.) + + A user agent returns a Cookie request header (see below) to the + origin server if it chooses to continue a session. The origin server + may ignore it or use it to determine the current state of the + + + +Kristol & Montulli Standards Track [Page 3] + +RFC 2109 HTTP State Management Mechanism February 1997 + + + session. It may send back to the client a Set-Cookie response header + with the same or different information, or it may send no Set-Cookie + header at all. The origin server effectively ends a session by + sending the client a Set-Cookie header with Max-Age=0. + + Servers may return a Set-Cookie response headers with any response. + User agents should send Cookie request headers, subject to other + rules detailed below, with every request. + + An origin server may include multiple Set-Cookie headers in a + response. Note that an intervening gateway could fold multiple such + headers into a single header. + +4.2.2 Set-Cookie Syntax + + The syntax for the Set-Cookie response header is + + set-cookie = "Set-Cookie:" cookies + cookies = 1#cookie + cookie = NAME "=" VALUE *(";" cookie-av) + NAME = attr + VALUE = value + cookie-av = "Comment" "=" value + | "Domain" "=" value + | "Max-Age" "=" value + | "Path" "=" value + | "Secure" + | "Version" "=" 1*DIGIT + + Informally, the Set-Cookie response header comprises the token Set- + Cookie:, followed by a comma-separated list of one or more cookies. + Each cookie begins with a NAME=VALUE pair, followed by zero or more + semi-colon-separated attribute-value pairs. The syntax for + attribute-value pairs was shown earlier. The specific attributes and + the semantics of their values follows. The NAME=VALUE attribute- + value pair must come first in each cookie. The others, if present, + can occur in any order. If an attribute appears more than once in a + cookie, the behavior is undefined. + + NAME=VALUE + Required. The name of the state information ("cookie") is NAME, + and its value is VALUE. NAMEs that begin with $ are reserved for + other uses and must not be used by applications. + + + + + + + + +Kristol & Montulli Standards Track [Page 4] + +RFC 2109 HTTP State Management Mechanism February 1997 + + + The VALUE is opaque to the user agent and may be anything the + origin server chooses to send, possibly in a server-selected + printable ASCII encoding. "Opaque" implies that the content is of + interest and relevance only to the origin server. The content + may, in fact, be readable by anyone that examines the Set-Cookie + header. + + Comment=comment + Optional. Because cookies can contain private information about a + user, the Cookie attribute allows an origin server to document its + intended use of a cookie. The user can inspect the information to + decide whether to initiate or continue a session with this cookie. + + Domain=domain + Optional. The Domain attribute specifies the domain for which the + cookie is valid. An explicitly specified domain must always start + with a dot. + + Max-Age=delta-seconds + Optional. The Max-Age attribute defines the lifetime of the + cookie, in seconds. The delta-seconds value is a decimal non- + negative integer. After delta-seconds seconds elapse, the client + should discard the cookie. A value of zero means the cookie + should be discarded immediately. + + Path=path + Optional. The Path attribute specifies the subset of URLs to + which this cookie applies. + + Secure + Optional. The Secure attribute (with no value) directs the user + agent to use only (unspecified) secure means to contact the origin + server whenever it sends back this cookie. + + The user agent (possibly under the user's control) may determine + what level of security it considers appropriate for "secure" + cookies. The Secure attribute should be considered security + advice from the server to the user agent, indicating that it is in + the session's interest to protect the cookie contents. + + Version=version + Required. The Version attribute, a decimal integer, identifies to + which version of the state management specification the cookie + conforms. For this specification, Version=1 applies. + + + + + + + +Kristol & Montulli Standards Track [Page 5] + +RFC 2109 HTTP State Management Mechanism February 1997 + + +4.2.3 Controlling Caching + + An origin server must be cognizant of the effect of possible caching + of both the returned resource and the Set-Cookie header. Caching + "public" documents is desirable. For example, if the origin server + wants to use a public document such as a "front door" page as a + sentinel to indicate the beginning of a session for which a Set- + Cookie response header must be generated, the page should be stored + in caches "pre-expired" so that the origin server will see further + requests. "Private documents", for example those that contain + information strictly private to a session, should not be cached in + shared caches. + + If the cookie is intended for use by a single user, the Set-cookie + header should not be cached. A Set-cookie header that is intended to + be shared by multiple users may be cached. + + The origin server should send the following additional HTTP/1.1 + response headers, depending on circumstances: + + * To suppress caching of the Set-Cookie header: Cache-control: no- + cache="set-cookie". + + and one of the following: + + * To suppress caching of a private document in shared caches: Cache- + control: private. + + * To allow caching of a document and require that it be validated + before returning it to the client: Cache-control: must-revalidate. + + * To allow caching of a document, but to require that proxy caches + (not user agent caches) validate it before returning it to the + client: Cache-control: proxy-revalidate. + + * To allow caching of a document and request that it be validated + before returning it to the client (by "pre-expiring" it): + Cache-control: max-age=0. Not all caches will revalidate the + document in every case. + + HTTP/1.1 servers must send Expires: old-date (where old-date is a + date long in the past) on responses containing Set-Cookie response + headers unless they know for certain (by out of band means) that + there are no downsteam HTTP/1.0 proxies. HTTP/1.1 servers may send + other Cache-Control directives that permit caching by HTTP/1.1 + proxies in addition to the Expires: old-date directive; the Cache- + Control directive will override the Expires: old-date for HTTP/1.1 + proxies. + + + +Kristol & Montulli Standards Track [Page 6] + +RFC 2109 HTTP State Management Mechanism February 1997 + + +4.3 User Agent Role + +4.3.1 Interpreting Set-Cookie + + The user agent keeps separate track of state information that arrives + via Set-Cookie response headers from each origin server (as + distinguished by name or IP address and port). The user agent + applies these defaults for optional attributes that are missing: + + VersionDefaults to "old cookie" behavior as originally specified by + Netscape. See the HISTORICAL section. + + Domain Defaults to the request-host. (Note that there is no dot at + the beginning of request-host.) + + Max-AgeThe default behavior is to discard the cookie when the user + agent exits. + + Path Defaults to the path of the request URL that generated the + Set-Cookie response, up to, but not including, the + right-most /. + + Secure If absent, the user agent may send the cookie over an + insecure channel. + +4.3.2 Rejecting Cookies + + To prevent possible security or privacy violations, a user agent + rejects a cookie (shall not store its information) if any of the + following is true: + + * The value for the Path attribute is not a prefix of the request- + URI. + + * The value for the Domain attribute contains no embedded dots or + does not start with a dot. + + * The value for the request-host does not domain-match the Domain + attribute. + + * The request-host is a FQDN (not IP address) and has the form HD, + where D is the value of the Domain attribute, and H is a string + that contains one or more dots. + + Examples: + + * A Set-Cookie from request-host y.x.foo.com for Domain=.foo.com + would be rejected, because H is y.x and contains a dot. + + + +Kristol & Montulli Standards Track [Page 7] + +RFC 2109 HTTP State Management Mechanism February 1997 + + + * A Set-Cookie from request-host x.foo.com for Domain=.foo.com would + be accepted. + + * A Set-Cookie with Domain=.com or Domain=.com., will always be + rejected, because there is no embedded dot. + + * A Set-Cookie with Domain=ajax.com will be rejected because the + value for Domain does not begin with a dot. + +4.3.3 Cookie Management + + If a user agent receives a Set-Cookie response header whose NAME is + the same as a pre-existing cookie, and whose Domain and Path + attribute values exactly (string) match those of a pre-existing + cookie, the new cookie supersedes the old. However, if the Set- + Cookie has a value for Max-Age of zero, the (old and new) cookie is + discarded. Otherwise cookies accumulate until they expire (resources + permitting), at which time they are discarded. + + Because user agents have finite space in which to store cookies, they + may also discard older cookies to make space for newer ones, using, + for example, a least-recently-used algorithm, along with constraints + on the maximum number of cookies that each origin server may set. + + If a Set-Cookie response header includes a Comment attribute, the + user agent should store that information in a human-readable form + with the cookie and should display the comment text as part of a + cookie inspection user interface. + + User agents should allow the user to control cookie destruction. An + infrequently-used cookie may function as a "preferences file" for + network applications, and a user may wish to keep it even if it is + the least-recently-used cookie. One possible implementation would be + an interface that allows the permanent storage of a cookie through a + checkbox (or, conversely, its immediate destruction). + + Privacy considerations dictate that the user have considerable + control over cookie management. The PRIVACY section contains more + information. + +4.3.4 Sending Cookies to the Origin Server + + When it sends a request to an origin server, the user agent sends a + Cookie request header to the origin server if it has cookies that are + applicable to the request, based on + + * the request-host; + + + + +Kristol & Montulli Standards Track [Page 8] + +RFC 2109 HTTP State Management Mechanism February 1997 + + + * the request-URI; + + * the cookie's age. + + The syntax for the header is: + + cookie = "Cookie:" cookie-version + 1*((";" | ",") cookie-value) + cookie-value = NAME "=" VALUE [";" path] [";" domain] + cookie-version = "$Version" "=" value + NAME = attr + VALUE = value + path = "$Path" "=" value + domain = "$Domain" "=" value + + The value of the cookie-version attribute must be the value from the + Version attribute, if any, of the corresponding Set-Cookie response + header. Otherwise the value for cookie-version is 0. The value for + the path attribute must be the value from the Path attribute, if any, + of the corresponding Set-Cookie response header. Otherwise the + attribute should be omitted from the Cookie request header. The + value for the domain attribute must be the value from the Domain + attribute, if any, of the corresponding Set-Cookie response header. + Otherwise the attribute should be omitted from the Cookie request + header. + + Note that there is no Comment attribute in the Cookie request header + corresponding to the one in the Set-Cookie response header. The user + agent does not return the comment information to the origin server. + + The following rules apply to choosing applicable cookie-values from + among all the cookies the user agent has. + + Domain Selection + The origin server's fully-qualified host name must domain-match + the Domain attribute of the cookie. + + Path Selection + The Path attribute of the cookie must match a prefix of the + request-URI. + + Max-Age Selection + Cookies that have expired should have been discarded and thus + are not forwarded to an origin server. + + + + + + + +Kristol & Montulli Standards Track [Page 9] + +RFC 2109 HTTP State Management Mechanism February 1997 + + + If multiple cookies satisfy the criteria above, they are ordered in + the Cookie header such that those with more specific Path attributes + precede those with less specific. Ordering with respect to other + attributes (e.g., Domain) is unspecified. + + Note: For backward compatibility, the separator in the Cookie header + is semi-colon (;) everywhere. A server should also accept comma (,) + as the separator between cookie-values for future compatibility. + +4.3.5 Sending Cookies in Unverifiable Transactions + + Users must have control over sessions in order to ensure privacy. + (See PRIVACY section below.) To simplify implementation and to + prevent an additional layer of complexity where adequate safeguards + exist, however, this document distinguishes between transactions that + are verifiable and those that are unverifiable. A transaction is + verifiable if the user has the option to review the request-URI prior + to its use in the transaction. A transaction is unverifiable if the + user does not have that option. Unverifiable transactions typically + arise when a user agent automatically requests inlined or embedded + entities or when it resolves redirection (3xx) responses from an + origin server. Typically the origin transaction, the transaction + that the user initiates, is verifiable, and that transaction may + directly or indirectly induce the user agent to make unverifiable + transactions. + + When it makes an unverifiable transaction, a user agent must enable a + session only if a cookie with a domain attribute D was sent or + received in its origin transaction, such that the host name in the + Request-URI of the unverifiable transaction domain-matches D. + + This restriction prevents a malicious service author from using + unverifiable transactions to induce a user agent to start or continue + a session with a server in a different domain. The starting or + continuation of such sessions could be contrary to the privacy + expectations of the user, and could also be a security problem. + + User agents may offer configurable options that allow the user agent, + or any autonomous programs that the user agent executes, to ignore + the above rule, so long as these override options default to "off". + + Many current user agents already provide a review option that would + render many links verifiable. For instance, some user agents display + the URL that would be referenced for a particular link when the mouse + pointer is placed over that link. The user can therefore determine + whether to visit that site before causing the browser to do so. + (Though not implemented on current user agents, a similar technique + could be used for a button used to submit a form -- the user agent + + + +Kristol & Montulli Standards Track [Page 10] + +RFC 2109 HTTP State Management Mechanism February 1997 + + + could display the action to be taken if the user were to select that + button.) However, even this would not make all links verifiable; for + example, links to automatically loaded images would not normally be + subject to "mouse pointer" verification. + + Many user agents also provide the option for a user to view the HTML + source of a document, or to save the source to an external file where + it can be viewed by another application. While such an option does + provide a crude review mechanism, some users might not consider it + acceptable for this purpose. + +4.4 How an Origin Server Interprets the Cookie Header + + A user agent returns much of the information in the Set-Cookie header + to the origin server when the Path attribute matches that of a new + request. When it receives a Cookie header, the origin server should + treat cookies with NAMEs whose prefix is $ specially, as an attribute + for the adjacent cookie. The value for such a NAME is to be + interpreted as applying to the lexically (left-to-right) most recent + cookie whose name does not have the $ prefix. If there is no + previous cookie, the value applies to the cookie mechanism as a + whole. For example, consider the cookie + + Cookie: $Version="1"; Customer="WILE_E_COYOTE"; + $Path="/acme" + + $Version applies to the cookie mechanism as a whole (and gives the + version number for the cookie mechanism). $Path is an attribute + whose value (/acme) defines the Path attribute that was used when the + Customer cookie was defined in a Set-Cookie response header. + +4.5 Caching Proxy Role + + One reason for separating state information from both a URL and + document content is to facilitate the scaling that caching permits. + To support cookies, a caching proxy must obey these rules already in + the HTTP specification: + + * Honor requests from the cache, if possible, based on cache validity + rules. + + * Pass along a Cookie request header in any request that the proxy + must make of another server. + + * Return the response to the client. Include any Set-Cookie response + header. + + + + + +Kristol & Montulli Standards Track [Page 11] + +RFC 2109 HTTP State Management Mechanism February 1997 + + + * Cache the received response subject to the control of the usual + headers, such as Expires, Cache-control: no-cache, and Cache- + control: private, + + * Cache the Set-Cookie subject to the control of the usual header, + Cache-control: no-cache="set-cookie". (The Set-Cookie header + should usually not be cached.) + + Proxies must not introduce Set-Cookie (Cookie) headers of their own + in proxy responses (requests). + +5. EXAMPLES + +5.1 Example 1 + + Most detail of request and response headers has been omitted. Assume + the user agent has no stored cookies. + + 1. User Agent -> Server + + POST /acme/login HTTP/1.1 + [form data] + + User identifies self via a form. + + 2. Server -> User Agent + + HTTP/1.1 200 OK + Set-Cookie: Customer="WILE_E_COYOTE"; Version="1"; Path="/acme" + + Cookie reflects user's identity. + + 3. User Agent -> Server + + POST /acme/pickitem HTTP/1.1 + Cookie: $Version="1"; Customer="WILE_E_COYOTE"; $Path="/acme" + [form data] + + User selects an item for "shopping basket." + + 4. Server -> User Agent + + HTTP/1.1 200 OK + Set-Cookie: Part_Number="Rocket_Launcher_0001"; Version="1"; + Path="/acme" + + Shopping basket contains an item. + + + + +Kristol & Montulli Standards Track [Page 12] + +RFC 2109 HTTP State Management Mechanism February 1997 + + + 5. User Agent -> Server + + POST /acme/shipping HTTP/1.1 + Cookie: $Version="1"; + Customer="WILE_E_COYOTE"; $Path="/acme"; + Part_Number="Rocket_Launcher_0001"; $Path="/acme" + [form data] + + User selects shipping method from form. + + 6. Server -> User Agent + + HTTP/1.1 200 OK + Set-Cookie: Shipping="FedEx"; Version="1"; Path="/acme" + + New cookie reflects shipping method. + + 7. User Agent -> Server + + POST /acme/process HTTP/1.1 + Cookie: $Version="1"; + Customer="WILE_E_COYOTE"; $Path="/acme"; + Part_Number="Rocket_Launcher_0001"; $Path="/acme"; + Shipping="FedEx"; $Path="/acme" + [form data] + + User chooses to process order. + + 8. Server -> User Agent + + HTTP/1.1 200 OK + + Transaction is complete. + + The user agent makes a series of requests on the origin server, after + each of which it receives a new cookie. All the cookies have the + same Path attribute and (default) domain. Because the request URLs + all have /acme as a prefix, and that matches the Path attribute, each + request contains all the cookies received so far. + +5.2 Example 2 + + This example illustrates the effect of the Path attribute. All + detail of request and response headers has been omitted. Assume the + user agent has no stored cookies. + + Imagine the user agent has received, in response to earlier requests, + the response headers + + + +Kristol & Montulli Standards Track [Page 13] + +RFC 2109 HTTP State Management Mechanism February 1997 + + + Set-Cookie: Part_Number="Rocket_Launcher_0001"; Version="1"; + Path="/acme" + + and + + Set-Cookie: Part_Number="Riding_Rocket_0023"; Version="1"; + Path="/acme/ammo" + + A subsequent request by the user agent to the (same) server for URLs + of the form /acme/ammo/... would include the following request + header: + + Cookie: $Version="1"; + Part_Number="Riding_Rocket_0023"; $Path="/acme/ammo"; + Part_Number="Rocket_Launcher_0001"; $Path="/acme" + + Note that the NAME=VALUE pair for the cookie with the more specific + Path attribute, /acme/ammo, comes before the one with the less + specific Path attribute, /acme. Further note that the same cookie + name appears more than once. + + A subsequent request by the user agent to the (same) server for a URL + of the form /acme/parts/ would include the following request header: + + Cookie: $Version="1"; Part_Number="Rocket_Launcher_0001"; $Path="/acme" + + Here, the second cookie's Path attribute /acme/ammo is not a prefix + of the request URL, /acme/parts/, so the cookie does not get + forwarded to the server. + +6. IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS + + Here we speculate on likely or desirable details for an origin server + that implements state management. + +6.1 Set-Cookie Content + + An origin server's content should probably be divided into disjoint + application areas, some of which require the use of state + information. The application areas can be distinguished by their + request URLs. The Set-Cookie header can incorporate information + about the application areas by setting the Path attribute for each + one. + + The session information can obviously be clear or encoded text that + describes state. However, if it grows too large, it can become + unwieldy. Therefore, an implementor might choose for the session + information to be a key to a server-side resource. Of course, using + + + +Kristol & Montulli Standards Track [Page 14] + +RFC 2109 HTTP State Management Mechanism February 1997 + + + a database creates some problems that this state management + specification was meant to avoid, namely: + + 1. keeping real state on the server side; + + 2. how and when to garbage-collect the database entry, in case the + user agent terminates the session by, for example, exiting. + +6.2 Stateless Pages + + Caching benefits the scalability of WWW. Therefore it is important + to reduce the number of documents that have state embedded in them + inherently. For example, if a shopping-basket-style application + always displays a user's current basket contents on each page, those + pages cannot be cached, because each user's basket's contents would + be different. On the other hand, if each page contains just a link + that allows the user to "Look at My Shopping Basket", the page can be + cached. + +6.3 Implementation Limits + + Practical user agent implementations have limits on the number and + size of cookies that they can store. In general, user agents' cookie + support should have no fixed limits. They should strive to store as + many frequently-used cookies as possible. Furthermore, general-use + user agents should provide each of the following minimum capabilities + individually, although not necessarily simultaneously: + + * at least 300 cookies + + * at least 4096 bytes per cookie (as measured by the size of the + characters that comprise the cookie non-terminal in the syntax + description of the Set-Cookie header) + + * at least 20 cookies per unique host or domain name + + User agents created for specific purposes or for limited-capacity + devices should provide at least 20 cookies of 4096 bytes, to ensure + that the user can interact with a session-based origin server. + + The information in a Set-Cookie response header must be retained in + its entirety. If for some reason there is inadequate space to store + the cookie, it must be discarded, not truncated. + + Applications should use as few and as small cookies as possible, and + they should cope gracefully with the loss of a cookie. + + + + + +Kristol & Montulli Standards Track [Page 15] + +RFC 2109 HTTP State Management Mechanism February 1997 + + +6.3.1 Denial of Service Attacks + + User agents may choose to set an upper bound on the number of cookies + to be stored from a given host or domain name or on the size of the + cookie information. Otherwise a malicious server could attempt to + flood a user agent with many cookies, or large cookies, on successive + responses, which would force out cookies the user agent had received + from other servers. However, the minima specified above should still + be supported. + +7. PRIVACY + +7.1 User Agent Control + + An origin server could create a Set-Cookie header to track the path + of a user through the server. Users may object to this behavior as + an intrusive accumulation of information, even if their identity is + not evident. (Identity might become evident if a user subsequently + fills out a form that contains identifying information.) This state + management specification therefore requires that a user agent give + the user control over such a possible intrusion, although the + interface through which the user is given this control is left + unspecified. However, the control mechanisms provided shall at least + allow the user + + * to completely disable the sending and saving of cookies. + + * to determine whether a stateful session is in progress. + + * to control the saving of a cookie on the basis of the cookie's + Domain attribute. + + Such control could be provided by, for example, mechanisms + + * to notify the user when the user agent is about to send a cookie + to the origin server, offering the option not to begin a session. + + * to display a visual indication that a stateful session is in + progress. + + * to let the user decide which cookies, if any, should be saved + when the user concludes a window or user agent session. + + * to let the user examine the contents of a cookie at any time. + + A user agent usually begins execution with no remembered state + information. It should be possible to configure a user agent never + to send Cookie headers, in which case it can never sustain state with + + + +Kristol & Montulli Standards Track [Page 16] + +RFC 2109 HTTP State Management Mechanism February 1997 + + + an origin server. (The user agent would then behave like one that is + unaware of how to handle Set-Cookie response headers.) + + When the user agent terminates execution, it should let the user + discard all state information. Alternatively, the user agent may ask + the user whether state information should be retained; the default + should be "no". If the user chooses to retain state information, it + would be restored the next time the user agent runs. + + NOTE: User agents should probably be cautious about using files to + store cookies long-term. If a user runs more than one instance of + the user agent, the cookies could be commingled or otherwise messed + up. + +7.2 Protocol Design + + The restrictions on the value of the Domain attribute, and the rules + concerning unverifiable transactions, are meant to reduce the ways + that cookies can "leak" to the "wrong" site. The intent is to + restrict cookies to one, or a closely related set of hosts. + Therefore a request-host is limited as to what values it can set for + Domain. We consider it acceptable for hosts host1.foo.com and + host2.foo.com to share cookies, but not a.com and b.com. + + Similarly, a server can only set a Path for cookies that are related + to the request-URI. + +8. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS + +8.1 Clear Text + + The information in the Set-Cookie and Cookie headers is unprotected. + Two consequences are: + + 1. Any sensitive information that is conveyed in them is exposed + to intruders. + + 2. A malicious intermediary could alter the headers as they travel + in either direction, with unpredictable results. + + These facts imply that information of a personal and/or financial + nature should only be sent over a secure channel. For less sensitive + information, or when the content of the header is a database key, an + origin server should be vigilant to prevent a bad Cookie value from + causing failures. + + + + + + +Kristol & Montulli Standards Track [Page 17] + +RFC 2109 HTTP State Management Mechanism February 1997 + + +8.2 Cookie Spoofing + + Proper application design can avoid spoofing attacks from related + domains. Consider: + + 1. User agent makes request to victim.cracker.edu, gets back + cookie session_id="1234" and sets the default domain + victim.cracker.edu. + + 2. User agent makes request to spoof.cracker.edu, gets back + cookie session-id="1111", with Domain=".cracker.edu". + + 3. User agent makes request to victim.cracker.edu again, and + passes + + Cookie: $Version="1"; + session_id="1234"; + session_id="1111"; $Domain=".cracker.edu" + + The server at victim.cracker.edu should detect that the second + cookie was not one it originated by noticing that the Domain + attribute is not for itself and ignore it. + +8.3 Unexpected Cookie Sharing + + A user agent should make every attempt to prevent the sharing of + session information between hosts that are in different domains. + Embedded or inlined objects may cause particularly severe privacy + problems if they can be used to share cookies between disparate + hosts. For example, a malicious server could embed cookie + information for host a.com in a URI for a CGI on host b.com. User + agent implementors are strongly encouraged to prevent this sort of + exchange whenever possible. + +9. OTHER, SIMILAR, PROPOSALS + + Three other proposals have been made to accomplish similar goals. + This specification is an amalgam of Kristol's State-Info proposal and + Netscape's Cookie proposal. + + Brian Behlendorf proposed a Session-ID header that would be user- + agent-initiated and could be used by an origin server to track + "clicktrails". It would not carry any origin-server-defined state, + however. Phillip Hallam-Baker has proposed another client-defined + session ID mechanism for similar purposes. + + + + + + +Kristol & Montulli Standards Track [Page 18] + +RFC 2109 HTTP State Management Mechanism February 1997 + + + While both session IDs and cookies can provide a way to sustain + stateful sessions, their intended purpose is different, and, + consequently, the privacy requirements for them are different. A + user initiates session IDs to allow servers to track progress through + them, or to distinguish multiple users on a shared machine. Cookies + are server-initiated, so the cookie mechanism described here gives + users control over something that would otherwise take place without + the users' awareness. Furthermore, cookies convey rich, server- + selected information, whereas session IDs comprise user-selected, + simple information. + +10. HISTORICAL + +10.1 Compatibility With Netscape's Implementation + + HTTP/1.0 clients and servers may use Set-Cookie and Cookie headers + that reflect Netscape's original cookie proposal. These notes cover + inter-operation between "old" and "new" cookies. + +10.1.1 Extended Cookie Header + + This proposal adds attribute-value pairs to the Cookie request header + in a compatible way. An "old" client that receives a "new" cookie + will ignore attributes it does not understand; it returns what it + does understand to the origin server. A "new" client always sends + cookies in the new form. + + An "old" server that receives a "new" cookie will see what it thinks + are many cookies with names that begin with a $, and it will ignore + them. (The "old" server expects these cookies to be separated by + semi-colon, not comma.) A "new" server can detect cookies that have + passed through an "old" client, because they lack a $Version + attribute. + +10.1.2 Expires and Max-Age + + Netscape's original proposal defined an Expires header that took a + date value in a fixed-length variant format in place of Max-Age: + + Wdy, DD-Mon-YY HH:MM:SS GMT + + Note that the Expires date format contains embedded spaces, and that + "old" cookies did not have quotes around values. Clients that + implement to this specification should be aware of "old" cookies and + Expires. + + + + + + +Kristol & Montulli Standards Track [Page 19] + +RFC 2109 HTTP State Management Mechanism February 1997 + + +10.1.3 Punctuation + + In Netscape's original proposal, the values in attribute-value pairs + did not accept "-quoted strings. Origin servers should be cautious + about sending values that require quotes unless they know the + receiving user agent understands them (i.e., "new" cookies). A + ("new") user agent should only use quotes around values in Cookie + headers when the cookie's version(s) is (are) all compliant with this + specification or later. + + In Netscape's original proposal, no whitespace was permitted around + the = that separates attribute-value pairs. Therefore such + whitespace should be used with caution in new implementations. + +10.2 Caching and HTTP/1.0 + + Some caches, such as those conforming to HTTP/1.0, will inevitably + cache the Set-Cookie header, because there was no mechanism to + suppress caching of headers prior to HTTP/1.1. This caching can lead + to security problems. Documents transmitted by an origin server + along with Set-Cookie headers will usually either be uncachable, or + will be "pre-expired". As long as caches obey instructions not to + cache documents (following Expires: <a date in the past> or Pragma: + no-cache (HTTP/1.0), or Cache-control: no-cache (HTTP/1.1)) + uncachable documents present no problem. However, pre-expired + documents may be stored in caches. They require validation (a + conditional GET) on each new request, but some cache operators loosen + the rules for their caches, and sometimes serve expired documents + without first validating them. This combination of factors can lead + to cookies meant for one user later being sent to another user. The + Set-Cookie header is stored in the cache, and, although the document + is stale (expired), the cache returns the document in response to + later requests, including cached headers. + +11. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS + + This document really represents the collective efforts of the + following people, in addition to the authors: Roy Fielding, Marc + Hedlund, Ted Hardie, Koen Holtman, Shel Kaphan, Rohit Khare. + + + + + + + + + + + + +Kristol & Montulli Standards Track [Page 20] + +RFC 2109 HTTP State Management Mechanism February 1997 + + +12. AUTHORS' ADDRESSES + + David M. Kristol + Bell Laboratories, Lucent Technologies + 600 Mountain Ave. Room 2A-227 + Murray Hill, NJ 07974 + + Phone: (908) 582-2250 + Fax: (908) 582-5809 + EMail: dmk@bell-labs.com + + + Lou Montulli + Netscape Communications Corp. + 501 E. Middlefield Rd. + Mountain View, CA 94043 + + Phone: (415) 528-2600 + EMail: montulli@netscape.com + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Kristol & Montulli Standards Track [Page 21] + |